Automated Certificate Management Environment G. De Marco Internet-Draft independent Intended status: Standards Track B. Pitman Expires: 14 December 2025 12 June 2025 Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) with OpenID Federation 1.0 draft-demarco-acme-openid-federation-latest Abstract The Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) protocol allows server operators to obtain TLS certificates for their websites, based on a demonstration of control over the website's domain via a fully-automated challenge/response protocol. OpenID Federation 1.0 defines how to build a trust infrastructure using a trusted third-party model. It uses a trust evaluation mechanism to attest the possession of private keys, protocol specific metadata and miscellaneous administrative and technical information related to a specific entity. This document defines how X.509 certificates associated with a given OpenID Federation Entity can be issued by an X.509 Certification Authority through the ACME protocol to the organizations which are part of a federation built on top of OpenID Federation 1.0. About This Document This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC. Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-demarco-acme-openid- federation/. Discussion of this document takes place on the Automated Certificate Management Environment Working Group mailing list (mailto:acme@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/acme/. Subscribe at https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/acme/. Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/peppelinux/draft-demarco-acme-openid-federation. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 14 December 2025. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2025 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction 2. Target Audience and Use Cases 3. Terminology 4. Conventions and Definitions 5. Protocol Flow 5.1. Preconditions 5.2. Discovery 5.3. Entity Configuration Metadata 5.3.1. Issuer Metadata 5.3.2. Requestor Metadata 5.4. OpenID Federation Identifier 5.5. newOrder Request 5.6. OpenID Federation Challenge Type 5.6.1. CSR and Certificate Fields 6. Publication of the Certificates within the Federation 7. Certificate Lifecycle and Revocation 8. Errors 9. Security Considerations 10. IANA Considerations 10.1. ACME Registry Group 10.1.1. ACME Identifier Types 10.1.2. ACME Validation Methods 10.1.3. ACME Error Types 10.2. Assign X.509 PKIX Other Name 11. Normative References Contributors Authors' Addresses 1. Introduction This document describes extensions to the ACME protocol that integrate with OpenID Federation 1.0, allowing an ACME server to issue X.509 Certificates associated with a given OpenID Federation Entity. X.509 Certificates can be provided to one or more organizations, without having pre-established any direct relationship or contract. In a multilateral federation, composed of thousands of entities belonging to different organizations, all the participants adhere to the same regulation or trust framework. OpenID Federation 1.0 allows each participant to recognize other participants using a trust evaluation mechanism, with RESTful services and cryptographic materials. Federation members declare what kind Entities they are using a basic OpenID Federation component called an Entity Configuration, a signed JSON Web Token published in a well-known resource. This document defines new OpenID Federation Entity Types for certificate requestors and issuers, facilitating automated discovery of an issuer's ACME API. The new ACME challenge type defined in this document facilitates automated issuance of X.509 Certificates to requestors that can prove to a certificate issuer that they are trusted OpenID Federation 1.0 entities. This document extends the ACME protocol in the following ways: * It associates a cryptographic key with an OpenID Entity, rather than a domain, since the authentication and authorization of the requestor is asserted with OpenID Federation 1.0. * It defines how the OpenID Federation Subordinate Statements can be used for the publication of the X.509 Certificates, by a Superior Entity, that were previously issued with ACME. * It extends the ACME newOrder resource, as defined in Section 7.4 of [RFC8555], defining a new identifier type called openid- federation. 2. Target Audience and Use Cases The audience of the document are the multilateral federations that require automatic issuance of X.509 Certificates using an infrastructure of trust based on OpenID Federation 1.0. This specification can be implemented by: * Federation Entities that join a federation to attest themselves as trustworthy, and then retrieve X.509 Certificates for their official HTTPS Federation Entity ID. * Federation Entities that want to ask for and obtain X.509 Certificates for use in other protocols. 3. Terminology The terms "Federation Entity", "Trust Anchor", "Entity Configuration", "Subordinate Statement", "Superior Entity", "Immediate Superior Entity", "Federation Entity Keys", "Federation Entity Discovery", "Trust Mark" and "Trust Chain" used in this document are defined in Section 1.2 of [OPENID-FED]. The term "Certificate Signing Request" (CSR) used in this document is defined as a "Certification Request" in [RFC2986]. The term "Certification Authority" used in this document is defined in [RFC5280]. The terms "ACME Client" and "ACME Server" are defined in [RFC8555]. The specification also defines the following terms: Requestor: A Federation Entity which wants to request X.509 certificates. It operates a web server for hosting its Entity Configuration. It also operates an ACME client, extended according to this document. Certificate Issuer (or Issuer): A Federation Entity which issues X.509 certificates. It operates a web server for hosting its Entity Configuration. It also operates an ACME server, extended according to this document. 4. Conventions and Definitions The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. 5. Protocol Flow The protocol flow consists of the following phases: * *Discovery*: the Requestor discovers the available Certificate Issuers within a federation, inspecting the ACME issuer Entity types. This is discussed in Section 5.2. * *Issuance*: the Requestor requests a X.509 Certificate from a Certificate Issuer using the ACME protocol. The necessary extensions to ACME orders and challenges are discussed in Section 5.5 and Section 5.6, respectively. There are two ways the Certificate Issuer is able to check if a Requestor is part of the federation: * The Requestor provides a Trust Chain when solving the ACME challenge. This is RECOMMENDED since it reduces the effort of the Certificate Issuer in evaluating the trust to the Requestor. * The Requestor doesn't provide a Trust Chain in the challenge solution. The Certificate Issuer MUST start Federation Entity Discovery as described in Section 9 of [OPENID-FED]. The following diagram illustrates a successful interaction between Issuer and Requestor to retrieve an X.509 Certificate. The diagram assumes the Requestor has already discovered the Issuer, and the Requestor has already created an ACME account with the Issuer. ,-----------------. |Requestor's | ,-----------. |OpenID Federation| |Requestor's| ,------------------------. ,-----------------------. | Web Server | |ACME Client| |X.509 Certificate Issuer| |Federation Trust Anchor| `--------+--------' `-----+-----' `-----------+------------' `-----------+-----------' | | POST /acme/new-order | | | |---------------------------------> | | | | | | |Authorization at | | | |/acme/authz/[authz-id] | | | |Finalize at | | | | /acme/order/[order-id]/finalize | | | |<- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - | | | | | | | POST /acme/authz/[authz-id] | | | |---------------------------------> | | | | | | | openid-federation-01 Challenge | | | | at /acme/chall/[chall-id] | | | |<- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - | | | | | | ----. | | | | | Sign challenge token | | | | | with private key | | | <---' | | | | | | | | POST /acme/chall/[chall-id] | | | | with signed | | | | token and entity ID | | | | set to Requestor's ID | | | |---------------------------------> | | | | | | | Challenge validation | | | | beginning | | | |<- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - | | | | | | GET /.well-known/openid-federation | | |<---------------------------------------------------- | | | | | | Requestor's Entity Configuration | | | - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - > | | | | | | | ______________________________________________________ | | ! OPT / If requestor didn't provide Trust Chain | ! | | !_____/ | | ! | | ! | Determine Trust Chain | ! | | ! | from Issuer's | ! | | ! | Trust Anchor to Requestor| ! | | ! | (Federation Discovery) | ! | | ! | <------------------------>| ! | | !~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~! | | | | | | |----. | | | | | Evaluate Trust Chain | | | |<---' | | | | | | | |----. | | | | | Check | | | | | Entity Configuration | | | | | sub matches | | | | | Entity identifier | | | |<---' in the order | | | | | | | | | | | |----. | | | | | Check challenge | | | | | sig is signed | | | | | with key in | | | |<---' Entity Configuration | | | | | | _________________________________________________________________________ | | ! LOOP / Poll until authz status | ! | | ! / is "valid" or "invalid" | ! | | !_____/ | | ! | | ! | POST-as-GET | ! | | ! | /acme/authz/[authz-id] | ! | | ! |---------------------------------> ! | | ! | | ! | | ! | Current authz status | ! | | ! |<--------------------------------- ! | | !~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~! | | | | | | | | | | ___________________________________________________________________________ | | ! OPT / If the authz status is "valid" | ! | | !_____/ | | ! | | ! | POST | ! | | ! | /acme/orders/[order-id]/finalize| ! | | ! | with CSR | ! | | ! |---------------------------------> ! | | ! | | ! | | ! | |----. ! | | ! | | | Check CSR ! | | ! | | | validity ! | | ! | | | according to ! | | ! | | | protocol ! | | ! | |<---' and CA policy ! | | ! | | ! | | ! | | ! | | ! | Order object with certificate | ! | | ! | at /acme/cert/[cert-id] | ! | | ! |<- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ! | | ! | | ! | | ! | POST /acme/cert/[cert-id] | ! | | ! |---------------------------------> ! | | ! | | ! | | ! | Newly issued X.509 Certificate | ! | | ! |<- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ! | | !~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~! | ,--------+--------. ,-----+-----. ,-----------+------------. ,-----------+-----------. |Requestor's | |Requestor's| |X.509 Certificate Issuer| |Federation Trust Anchor| |OpenID Federation| |ACME Client| `------------------------' `-----------------------' | Web Server | `-----------' `-----------------' 5.1. Preconditions The protocol requires the following preconditions are met. 1. The Requestor and the Issuer MUST publish their Entity Configuration as defined in Section 9 of [OPENID-FED]. 2. The Issuer MUST implement an ACME server, extended according to this document. 3. The Requestor MUST publish the entity type acme_requestor in its Entity Configuration, according to Section 5.3.2. 4. The Issuer MUST publish the entity type acme_issuer in its Entity Configuration, according to Section 5.3.1. 5.2. Discovery The Requestor's ACME client may either be configured to use a particular ACME server, or to automatically discover a Certificate Issuer through the federation. Requestors that use discovery MAY select any Entity with an Entity type of acme_issuer, or they may additionally require that such entities have a valid Trust Mark with a particular Trust Mark Identifier. 5.3. Entity Configuration Metadata This section describes the metadata a Requestor and Issuer MUST publish in their respective Entity Configurations. 5.3.1. Issuer Metadata The Issuer MUST publish its Entity Configuration including the acme_issuer Entity Type metadata within it. The acme_issuer metadata contains one parameter, directory_url, which is the URL of the ACME Directory, as defined in Section 7.1.1 of [RFC8555]. Requestors MUST use the ACME Directory provided in the Issuer's Entity Configuration for client configuration of ACME endpoints. The following is a non-normative example of an Entity Configuration including the acme_issuer metadata: { "iss": "https://issuer.example.com", "sub": "https://issuer.example.com", "iat": 1516239022, "exp": 1516298022, "jwks": { "keys": [ { "kty": "RSA", "alg": "RS256", "use": "sig", "kid": "NzbLsXh8uDCcd-6MNwXF4W_7noWXFZAfHkxZsRGC9Xs", "n": "pnXBOusEANuug6ewezb9J_...", "e": "AQAB" } ] }, "metadata": { "acme_issuer": { "directory_url": "https://issuer.example.com/acme/directory" } } } 5.3.2. Requestor Metadata The Requestor MUST publish in its Entity Configuration an acme_requestor metadata containing a JWK set, according to Section 5.2.1 of [OPENID-FED]. The keys in the set are used to respond to ACME challenges. The following is a non-normative example of an Entity Configuration including the acme_requestor metadata and using the jwks metadata parameter. { "iss": "https://requestor.example.com", "sub": "https://requestor.example.com", "iat": 1516239022, "exp": 1516298022, "jwks": { "keys": [ { "kty": "RSA", "alg": "RS256", "use": "sig", "kid": "NzbLsXh8uDCcd-6MNwXF4W_7noWXFZAfHkxZsRGC9Xs", "n": "pnXBOusEANuug6ewezb9J_...", "e": "AQAB" } ] }, "metadata": { "acme_requestor": { "jwks": { "keys": [ { "kty": "RSA", "kid": "SUdtUndEWVY2cUFDeD...", "n": "y_Zc8rByfeRIC9fFZrD...", "e": "AQAB" }, { "kty": "EC", "kid": "MFYycG1raTI4SkZvVDBIMF9CNGw3VEZYUmxQLVN2T21nSWlkd3", "crv": "P-256", "x": "qAOdPQROkHfZY1daGofOmSNQWpYK8c9G2m2Rbkpbd4c", "y": "G_7fF-T8n2vONKM15Mzj4KR_shvHBxKGjMosF6FdoPY" } ] } } } } The Issuer MUST only use the Requestor's acme_requestor to validate an ACME challenge. Therefore, after completing the challenge, the Requestor MAY remove the acme_requestor metadata from its Entity Configuration. 5.4. OpenID Federation Identifier This document defines a new ACME identifier type for OpenID Federation entities, openid-federation, whose value is the sub parameter of the requestor's Entity Configuration, as defined in Section 1.2 of [OPENID-FED]. 5.5. newOrder Request The Requestor begins certificate issuance by sending a HTTP POST request to the Issuer's newOrder resource, as specified in Section 7.4 of [RFC8555]. A non-normative example of an ACME newOrder request: POST /acme/new-order HTTP/1.1 Host: issuer.example.com Content-Type: application/jose+json { "protected": base64url({ "alg": "ES256", "kid": "https://issuer.example.com/acme/acct/evOfKhNU60wg", "nonce": "5XJ1L3lEkMG7tR6pA00clA", "url": "https://issuer.example.com/acme/new-order" }), "payload": base64url({ "identifiers": [ { "type": "openid-federation", "value": "https://requestor.example.com" } ], "notBefore": "2016-01-01T00:04:00+04:00", "notAfter": "2016-01-08T00:04:00+04:00" }), "signature": "H6ZXtGjTZyUnPeKn...wEA4TklBdh3e454g" } 5.6. OpenID Federation Challenge Type The OpenID Federation challenge type allows a Requestor to prove control of a Federation Entity using the trust evaluation mechanism provided by [OPENID-FED]. The Requestor demonstrates control of a cryptographic public key published in its OpenID Federation Entity Configuration. The openid-federation-01 ACME challenge object has the following format: type (required, string): The string "openid-federation-01" token (required, string): A random value that uniquely identifies the challenge. This value MUST have at least 128 bits of entropy. It MUST NOT contain any characters outside the base64url alphabet as described in Section 5 of [RFC4648]. Trailing '=' padding characters MUST be stripped. See [RFC4086] for additional information on randomness requirements. trustAnchors (optional, array of string): An array of strings containing Entity Identifiers of the Issuer's Trust Anchors. When solving the challenge, the Requestor can construct a Trust Chain from itself to one of these Trust Anchors. It is RECOMMENDED that the Issuer includes this field to make it easier for the Requestor to construct a Trust Chain. A non-normative example of a challenge with trustAnchors specified: { "type": "openid-federation-01", "url": "https://issuer.example.com/acme/chall/prV_B7yEyA4", "status": "pending", "token": "LoqXcYV8q5ONbJQxbmR7SCTNo3tiAXDfowyjxAjEuX0", "trustAnchors": [ "https://trust-anchor-1.example.com", "https://trust-anchor-2.example.com" ] } The openid-federation-01 challenge MUST NOT be used to issue X.509 Certificates for any identifiers except openid-federation identifiers. The openid-federation identifier MUST NOT be validated except by the openid-federation-01 challenge. The Requestor responds to the challenge with an object with the following format: sig (required, string): the compact JSON serialization (as described in Section 7.1 of [RFC7515]) of a JWS, signing the key authorization encoded in UTF-8. The key authorization is computed from the token in the challenge and the Requestor's ACME account key, as defined in Section 8.1 of [RFC8555]. The signature must be made by one of the keys published in the Requestor's acme_requestor metadata in its Entity Configuration, as specified in Section 5.3.2. The JWS MUST include a kid header parameter corresponding to the key used to sign the key authorization and a typ header parameter set to "signed-acme- challenge+jwt". trustChain (optional, array of string): an array of strings containing signed JWTs, representing a Trust Chain from the Requestor to one of the Issuer's Trust Anchors (see Section 4 of [OPENID-FED]). The Entity Configuration of the Trust Chain subject MUST contain acme_requestor metadata that is valid under the Trust Chain's resolved metadata policy (Section 6.1 of [OPENID-FED]) and contains the key used to compute sig. It is RECOMMENDED that the Requestor includes this field. If the Requestor cannot construct a Trust Chain to one of the Trust Anchors indicated by the Issuer, or if no Trust Anchors were indicated, it MAY use some other Trust Anchor that it believes the Issuer trusts. If the Requestor cannot construct a Trust Chain to any Trust Anchor, it MAY omit the trustChain field from the challenge response. A non-normative example for an authorization with trustChain specified: POST /acme/chall/prV_B7yEyA4 Host: issuer.example.com Content-Type: application/jose+json { "protected": base64url({ "alg": "ES256", "kid": "https://issuer.example.com/acme/acct/evOfKhNU60wg", "nonce": "UQI1PoRi5OuXzxuX7V7wL0", "url": "https://issuer.example.com/acme/chall/prV_B7yEyA4" }), "payload": base64url({ "sig": "wQAvHlPV1tVxRW0vZUa4BQ...", "trustChain": ["eyJhbGciOiJFU...", "eyJhbGci..."] }), "signature": "Q1bURgJoEslbD1c5...3pYdSMLio57mQNN4" } On receiving a challenge response, the Certificate Issuer verifies that the Requestor is trusted. If the Requestor did not provide a trustChain, the Issuer MUST perform Federation Entity Discovery (Section 10 of [OPENID-FED]) to obtain a Trust Chain for the Requestor. Once it has obtained a Trust Chain, the Issuer verifies: * That the Requestor's acme_requestor metadata is valid under the Trust Chain's resolved metadata policy (Section 6.1 of [OPENID-FED]). * That the requested openid-federation identifier value matches the sub parameter of the Requestor's Entity Configuration. * That the sig field of the payload is the compact JSON serialization of a JWS signing the key authorization, signed with a key from the Requestor's acme_requestor metadata (Section 5.3.2) whose kid matches the kid claim in the challenge response. If all of the above checks succeed, then the validation is successful. Otherwise, it has failed. In either case, the Certificate Issuer responds according to Section 7.5.1 of [RFC8555]. If the Issuer fails to verify OpenID Federation trust, the problem document SHOULD contain a subproblem of type urn:ietf:params:acme:error:openIDFederationEntity and the error code invalid_trust_chain (Section 8.9 of [OPENID-FED]). A non-normative example for the challenge object post-validation: { "type": "openid-federation-01", "url": "https://issuer.example.com/acme/chall/prV_B7yEyA4", "status": "valid", "validated": "2024-10-01T12:05:13.72Z", "token": "LoqXcYV8q5ONbJQxbmR7SCTNo3tiAXDfowyjxAjEuX0" } 5.6.1. CSR and Certificate Fields Depending on the Certificate Issuer's X.509 Certificate profile, the CSR and X.509 Certificate MAY associate the X.509 Certificate to the Federation Entity by including the Entity ID in the X.509 Certificate. To do so, the Issuer includes a Subject Alternative Name extension containing an otherName with a type-id of id-on- OpenIdFederationEntityId. The value of the name is an Octet String containing the UTF-8 encoding of the Entity ID (i.e., the URI in the corresponding openid-federation identifier from the newOrder request). id-on-OpenIdFederationEntityId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-on XXX } OpenIdFederationEntityId ::= UTF8String 6. Publication of the Certificates within the Federation The X.509 Certificates issued by federation Immediate Superior Entities pertaining to one or more Federation Entity Keys in control of their Subordinates MAY publish this information by including the x5c member in each JWK contained within the matching Subordinate Statement. The contents of the published x5c member, including whether it contains a full or partial Trust Chain, and if so, to what Trust Anchor, are policy decisions out of scope for this document. 7. Certificate Lifecycle and Revocation The identity of the Requestor is verified through proof of possession of a private key corresponding to a public key attested within a Trust Chain. It is up to the Certificate Issuer to decide the expiration time of the X.509 Certificate. In some cases, and when required, it MAY be set to match the expiration of the Trust Chain. A Requestor SHOULD request the revocation of its X.509 Certificate when the related cryptographic material is revoked. The Requestor SHOULD publish the revoked or expired cryptographic keys in the Federation Historical Key Registry. The X.509 Certificate revocation request is defined in Section 7.6 of [RFC8555]. 8. Errors This document defines one new error type URI to be used in problem documents [RFC9457], as described in Section 6.7 of [RFC8555]. The error type urn:ietf:params:acme:error:openIDFederationEntity can be used to encapsulate any OAuth error code returned while resolving OpenID Federation Entities. The title of this error type is "OpenID Federation Error". The detail member of the problem document MAY include the description of the particular OAuth error code that caused the error. The problem document for this error type SHOULD include an extension member named error_code. The error_code member SHOULD be set to the OAuth error code, taken from the IANA "OAuth Extensions Error Registry" [IANA-OAUTH]. 9. Security Considerations The openid-federation-01 challenge defined in Section 5.6 defends against replay attacks by malicious ACME servers because the signature in challenge responses is over an ACME key authorization, which binds the ACME account key. The cryptographic keys in the acme_requestor metadata SHOULD NOT be reused for other purposes than signing responses to acme- federation-01 challenges. For example, the same keys SHOULD NOT be reused in the issued X.509 Certificate. If the keys are reused for other purposes, cross-protocol attacks MUST be considered. The cryptographic keys in the acme_requestor metadata SHOULD be rotated periodically. 10. IANA Considerations IANA is kindly asked to make the following updates to registries: 10.1. ACME Registry Group The following updates are all assignments in the "Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) Protocol" registry group [IANA-ACME]. 10.1.1. ACME Identifier Types IANA is asked to add to the "ACME Identifier Types" registry, defined in Section 9.7.7 of [RFC8555], the entry below, as specified here in Section 5.4: +===================+===============+ | Label | Reference | +===================+===============+ | openid-federation | this document | +-------------------+---------------+ Table 1 10.1.2. ACME Validation Methods IANA is also asked to add to the "ACME Validation Methods" registry, defined in Section 9.7.8 of [RFC8555], the entry below, as specified here in Section 5.6: +======================+===================+===============+ | Label | Identifier Type | Reference | +======================+===================+===============+ | openid-federation-01 | openid-federation | this document | +----------------------+-------------------+---------------+ Table 2 10.1.3. ACME Error Types IANA is also asked to add to the "ACME Error Types" registry, defined in Section 9.7.4 of [RFC8555], the entry below, as specified here in Section 8: +========================+=========================+===========+ | Type | Description | Reference | +========================+=========================+===========+ | openIDFederationEntity | An error occurred while | this | | | resolving an OpenID | document | | | Federation entity | | +------------------------+-------------------------+-----------+ Table 3 10.2. Assign X.509 PKIX Other Name IANA is asked to add to the "PKIX Other Name Forms" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8 (https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi- numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8)) the entry below, as specified here in Section 5.6.1 +=========+================================+===============+ | Decimal | Description | Reference | +=========+================================+===============+ | TBA | id-on-OpenIdFederationEntityId | this document | +---------+--------------------------------+---------------+ Table 4 11. Normative References [IANA-ACME] IANA, "Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) Protocol", n.d., . [IANA-OAUTH] IANA, "OAuth Parameters", n.d., . [OPENID-FED] Hedberg, R., Jones, M. B., Solberg, A. Å., Bradley, J., De Marco, G., and V. Dzhuvinov, "OpenID Federation 1.0 - draft 41", 4 December 2024, . [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986, DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000, . [RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005, . [RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006, . [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, . [RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May 2015, . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, . [RFC8555] Barnes, R., Hoffman-Andrews, J., McCarney, D., and J. Kasten, "Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME)", RFC 8555, DOI 10.17487/RFC8555, March 2019, . [RFC9457] Nottingham, M., Wilde, E., and S. Dalal, "Problem Details for HTTP APIs", RFC 9457, DOI 10.17487/RFC9457, July 2023, . Contributors David Cook ISRG Email: divergentdave@gmail.com Ameer Ghani ISRG Email: inahga@letsencrypt.org J.C. Jones ISRG Email: ietf@insufficient.coffee Tim Geoghegan ISRG Email: timgeog+ietf@gmail.com Authors' Addresses Giuseppe De Marco independent Email: demarcog83@gmail.com Brandon Pitman Email: bran@bran.land